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6Summary
  0DQ\ FDPSDLJQHUV ZRUNLQJ LQ WKH ¿HOG RI SXEOLF KHDOWK EHOLHYH 
that good health and free market capitalism are irreconcilable. 
7KH\ UHJDUG DGYHUWLVLQJ FRPSHWLWLRQ DQG WKH SXUVXLW RI SUR¿W DV 
major causes of unhealthy consumption and view disfavoured 
industries as ‘disease vectors’. Accordingly, they support political 
action which limits commercial speech and restricts product 
development.
  One consequence of this ‘neo-prohibitionist’ approach is that 
innovative products are banned under the precautionary principle. 
The sale of the two least hazardous recreational nicotine products 
- e-cigarettes and Swedish snus - are banned in many countries 
despite growing evidence that they can play an important role in 
reducing the smoking rate.  
  The public health movement is divided between those who support 
the ‘neo-prohibitionist’ approach and those who support ‘harm 
reduction’. Opponents of harm reduction claim that safer nicotine 
products act as a ‘gateway’ to smoking and deter smokers from 
quitting. However, most evidence suggests that nicotine products 
have little appeal to nonsmokers and are overwhelmingly used 
as a gateway from smoking. 
  Arguments made against tobacco harm reduction on health 
grounds are not compelling. Opposition to e-cigarettes and snus 
can only be properly understood in the context of longstanding 
moral objections and anti-industry sentiment. 
7  There is evidence that orthodox tobacco control policies are 
having only a limited effect on smoking rates in Europe. Countries 
that follow the model of smoking bans, high tobacco taxes and 
graphic warnings do not have lower smoking rates than other 
countries. Evidence from Sweden strongly suggests that the 
harm reduction approach has more to offer than the neo-
prohibitionist model.  
  Smokers should not be discouraged or forbidden from switching 
to vastly less hazardous forms of nicotine use. Unless alternative 
QLFRWLQH SURGXFWV SRVH VLJQL¿FDQW ULVNV WR KHDOWK RU DFW DV D 
JDWHZD\ WR VPRNLQJ WKHUH LV QR MXVWL¿FDWLRQ IRU WKHP EHLQJ 
KHDYLO\ UHJXODWHG RU EDQQHG 7KH PDLQ EHQH¿FLDULHV RI WKH QHR
prohibitionist approach are the incumbent cigarette industry and 
the pharmaceutical industry. If health is the goal, governments 
should step back and allow free market solutions to gain popularity. 
In practice, this means taxing and regulating e-cigarettes as 
ordinary consumer products and allowing snus to be sold with 
appropriate and accurate labelling to inform customers of its risk 
SUR¿OH UHODWLYH WR FLJDUHWWHV
  The prohibition of safer tobacco products has led to unnecessary 
deaths in the European Union and elsewhere. It is highly likely 
that the prohibition and excessive regulation of e-cigarettes will 
also lead to unnecessary premature deaths. The neo-prohibitionist 
DSSURDFK LV XQMXVWL¿DEOH IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI ERWK SHUVRQDO 
liberty and population health. 
  Recent developments in the fragmented nicotine industry show 
that private enterprise can correct market failure long before 
JRYHUQPHQW IDLOXUH LV HYHQ DFNQRZOHGJHG OHW DORQH UHFWL¿HG 
The interests of consumers are better advanced by the provision 
of accurate information and free choice than by prohibitions and 
restrictions on commercial speech.
8Free markets versus health?
Epidemics of infectious diseases are largely a thing of the past in 
wealthy societies today. The traditional public health approach of 
education, vaccination and sanitation has eradicated many of the 
lethal diseases of the past and those which remain are often treatable 
with modern medicine. Life expectancy in the UK has risen from 47 
years in 1900 to 79 years today. The major causes of death are no 
ORQJHU FRQWDJLRXV NLOOHUV VXFK DV LQÀXHQ]D WXEHUFXORVLV DQG 
gastrointestinal infection, but non-communicable diseases such as 
cancer and heart disease which most often affect the elderly.
Since some of the risk factors for these diseases of old age are 
rooted in private behaviour such as eating, drinking, smoking and 
physical inactivity, the focus of the modern ‘public health’ movement 
has shifted from protecting people from diseases carried by others 
to attempting to protect people from themselves. Initially, this meant 
raising awareness and offering information about healthy living. 
Today, with the population generally well informed about the risks 
of smoking, drinking and overeating, the inclination of millions of 
people to turn a blind eye to medical advice cannot be attributed to 
ignorance alone. As the limits of education as a means of encouraging 
the public to mend their ways became evident, the public health 
lobby turned to a more intrusive and forceful approach than had 
traditionally been within the remit of government-led health campaigns. 
The stark difference between tackling infectious diseases with 
collective action and tackling non-communicable diseases by 
regulating personal behaviour has been partially masked by changing 
WHUPLQRORJ\ 7KH FRQFHSW RI µSXEOLF KHDOWK¶ LV QRZ GH¿QHG VR EURDGO\ 
9that gambling and gender equality are seen as no lesser ‘public 
KHDOWK LVVXHV¶ WKDQ PDODULD DQG ZDWHU ÀXRULGDWLRQ .RUQ DQG 6KDIIHU 
1999). The word ‘epidemic’ has been almost entirely divorced from 
its original meaning of being an outbreak of infectious disease and 
is instead used to describe endemic behaviour such as drinking, 
or non-contagious diseases such as cancer, or physical conditions 
such as obesity which are neither diseases nor activities.1 Although 
it amounts to little more than euphemism, such terminology helps 
to maintain the conceit that governments have the same rights and 
responsibility to police the ‘bad habits’ of its citizens as they do to 
ensure that drinking water is uncontaminated.
,Q SUDFWLFH WKHUH DUH PDQ\ LQVXUPRXQWDEOH REVWDFOHV LQ WKH ¿HOG 
of ‘lifestyle regulation’ (to use a more candid term for ‘public health’). 
,W PD\ EH GHVLUDEOH WR HDW ¿YH SLHFHV RI IUXLW RU YHJ D GD\ RU WR WDNH 
30 minutes vigorous exercise, but such behaviour cannot be 
mandated outside of an army barracks, school or totalitarian state. 
With compulsion of this sort largely unavailable to them, the public 
health lobby instead favours legislative action which target products 
in the marketplace which are deemed to be unhealthy (Callard, 
2013). Regardless of whether these products are hazardous per 
se (eg. cigarettes) or are merely hazardous when consumed in 
excess (eg. salt, alcohol), the objective is to reduce their consumption 
at the population level. 
It is a short step from demonising ‘demerit goods’ to vilifying the 
industries that produce them, especially when the targeted 
businesses generally oppose regulations which curtail their ability 
to communicate with their customers and compete with their rivals. 
In keeping with the terminology that portrays consumer products 
as the source of ‘epidemics’, the relevant industries are viewed as 
‘disease vectors’. This analogy has been made explicitly by Anna 
Gilmore of Bath University, who views public health issues as a 
chain in which there is ‘the host (the consumer), agent (the product, 
e.g. cigarettes, alcohol), environment and, crucially, the disease 
vector (the corporation).’ (Gilmore, 2011: 2) 
 1   ‘Labeling obesity a disease may be expedient but it is not a necessary step in a cam-
paign to combat obesity and it may be interpreted as self-serving advocacy without a 
VRXQG VFLHQWL¿F EDVLV¶ +HVKND DQG $OOLVRQ 001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The depiction of the consumer as a passive, unwilling ‘host’ is apt. 
There is no expectation on the part of public health that individuals 
should take any measure of responsibility for their habits and health; 
to do so would be ‘victim blaming’ since ordinary citizens cannot be 
expected to resist ‘corporate power’ (Hastings, 2012). 
Nor is there any suggestion that businesses sell products because 
people want to buy them. The relationship is always viewed from the 
other end of the telescope - people buy products because businesses 
market and sell them. When campaigners disapprove of a product, 
it is not merely advertised, it is ‘aggressively marketed’. Customers 
do not voluntarily exchange money for goods, but are ‘recruited’ by 
corporations. Often these recruits have been ‘lured’ by ‘glitzy’ packaging 
or ‘seductive’ advertising. Food is not cooked to make it tasty, it is 
‘manipulated’ to keep us coming back for more. Companies do not 
ZRUN KDUG WR SHUVXDGH WKH ¿FNOH SXEOLF WR NHHS EX\LQJ LWV SURGXFW 
they ‘control’ x per cent of the market - another expression of their 
supposed power over the consumer. Industries are not made up of 
FRPSHWLQJ ¿UPV EXW DUH PRQROLWKLF JLDQWV %LJ 7REDFFR %LJ $OFRKRO 
Big Food) engaged in a conspiracy against the public. While public 
health lobbyists are ‘advocates’, commercial lobbyists are ‘hucksters’, 
‘mouthpieces’, ‘shills’ and ‘hired guns’. The root causes of ‘unhealthy 
consumption’, says Gerard Hastings of Stirling University, are 
‘evocative promotion, ubiquitous distribution, perpetual new product 
development, and seductive pricing strategies’ (Hastings, 2012b). 
$OWKRXJK WKHVH YLHZV DUH QRW XQLYHUVDO LQ WKH ¿HOG RI SXEOLF KHDOWK 
they have become increasingly dominant. As public health historian 
Virginia Berridge writes: ‘Hostility to industrial interests now pervades 
WKH SXEOLF KHDOWK ¿HOG FDPSDLJQHUV RQ REHVLW\ DWWDFN WKH IRRG 
LQGXVWU\ DQG WKH GULQNV LQGXVWU\ DQG LWV LQÀXHQFH ZLWKLQ WKH 
government is reviled by some sections of the alcohol research 
community.’ (Berridge, 2007: 82) As the following recommendation 
from a group of ‘civil society’ actors makes clear, it is assumed that 
SULYDWH SUR¿W DQG SXEOLF KHDOWK DUH LUUHFRQFLODEOH
‘ The policy development stage should be free from industry 
involvement to ensure a ‘health in all policies’ approach,  
ZKLFK LV QRW FRPSURPLVHG E\ WKH REYLRXV FRQÀLFWV RI LQWHUHVWV 
associated with the food alcohol, beverage and other industries, 
that are primarily answerable to shareholders.’ (Eurocare, 2011)
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This distrust of private enterprise extends to advocates of free 
PDUNHWV ZKR DUH E\ GH¿QLWLRQ RSSRQHQWV RI SURKLELWLRQ DQG 
excessive regulation. ‘Public health doctors have unanimously 
hated Thatcher and her legacy’, writes Richard Smith, the former 
editor of the British Medical Association, because ‘her ideological 
commitment to individualism’ sat uneasily with the collectivist 
sensibilities of the public health lobby (Smith, 2013). Although there 
is no evidence that people are more healthy in countries where 
markets are less free - and ample evidence that economic growth 
leads better health outcomes - many in public health believe that 
good health and free market capitalism are irreconcilable. 
The hazards of groupthink
In the new public health discourse, non-communicable diseases 
are largely caused by the production and sale of unhealthy 
products, which campaigners view as a market failure (Gilmore 
et al., 2010). Industry and the free market are therefore both 
culpable for lethal illnesses and must be brought to heel by the 
state. In practice, this involves using demand-side and supply-side 
measures, up to and including prohibition, to control commercial 
activity through tight regulation of the existing product, the 
prohibition of new variants of the product, higher excise taxes 
and the elimination of marketing. This approach requires political 
will rather than medical know-how and has been termed ‘neo-
prohibitionism’ (Mindus, 2003; Studlar, 2013).  
Tackling perceived market failure by transferring power from the 
market to the state increases the chance of government failure. 
:KLOVW FRPSDQLHV DUH YLOL¿HG IRU PDNLQJ PRQH\ RXW RI GHPHULW JRRGV 
their customers are dismissed as irrational addicts/victims. Both of 
these stakeholders are therefore excluded from the policy-making 
process, leaving only a narrow elite of public health advocates to 
dictate the nature of legislation. Echo chambers such as this carry 
their own risks. The most obvious problem is that they might simply 
be wrong. The further they stray from their area of formal expertise, 
the more likely they are to be in error - and the smaller the elite, the 
OHVV OLNHO\ LW LV WKDW PLVWDNHV ZLOO EH UHFWL¿HG :KDW WKH\ FDOO µKHDOWK 
policy’ often involves profound questions of economics, law, ethics, 
intellectual property, constitutional rights and political philosophy 
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which fall far outside the remit of a medic or scientist. What they see 
as the ‘public interest’ is often no more than a narrow interest of risk 
management and lifestyle regulation that has never won the battle 
of ideas, let alone ever stood for election. 
The damage that can be wrought by groupthink is limited so long 
DV LW LV FRQ¿QHG WR PHUH DGYLFH ,W LV PRUH GDQJHURXV ZKHQ LW 
becomes enshrined in binding legislation from which there is no 
escape. This paper looks at how neo-prohibitionist regulation and 
DQWLIUHH PDUNHW OHJLVODWLRQ FDQ KDUP KHDOWK E\ VWLÀLQJ LQQRYDWLRQ 
raising barriers to entry and misinforming the public. We use the 
example of tobacco and nicotine where anti-industry sentiment is 
PRVW ¿UPO\ HQWUHQFKHG :H DUJXH WKDW ZKHUH WKHUH LV VWURQJ GHPDQG 
for healthier options, the free market is often able to provide them 
without hampering personal liberty. A policy of state intervention 
and anti-industry ideology, on the other hand, can jeopardise both 
liberty and health. 
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The search for a safer cigarette
In the twentieth century, efforts to reduce the hazards of cigarette 
smoking were led by the tobacco industry and involved modifying 
FRQYHQWLRQDO FLJDUHWWHV &HOOXORVH ¿OWHUV ZHUH DGGHG WR FLJDUHWWHV 
as early as the 1930s and tobacco companies experimented with 
RWKHU ¿OWHUV RQFH WKH KD]DUGV RI VPRNLQJ EHFDPH FRPPRQ 
NQRZOHGJH ,QQRYDWLRQV LQFOXGHG WKH VHOHFWLYH ¿OWHU RQ %URZQ 	 
Williamson’s short-lived Fact brand (launched 1975), the charcoal 
¿OWHU RQ /LJJHWW 	 0\HUV¶ Lark brand (launched 1962) and the 
LQIDPRXV µPLFURQLWH¶ ¿OWHU RQ /RULOODUG¶V Kent brand (launched 1952) 
which contained asbestos. 
Formal acceptance of the link between smoking and lung cancer 
by the Royal College of Physicians and the US Surgeon General 
in the early 1960s made the search for a safer cigarette all the 
PRUH XUJHQW ,QFHQWLYLVHG E\ WKH HQRUPRXV SUR¿WV WKDW ZRXOG IROORZ 
from the invention of a safer cigarette, tobacco companies employed 
various creative methods but to no avail. Industry and public health 
scientists initially believed that it would be possible to identify and 
remove carcinogenic compounds from tobacco, although these 
hopes faded as they began to grasp the enormity of the challenge 
(Berridge, 2007: 92-93). Neutering the harms of smoking requires 
much more than isolating and expelling one chemical culprit. Burnt 
tobacco contains too many carcinogens for all to be removed and 
even if that were possible, carbon monoxide would remain. 
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Nevertheless, twentieth century tobacco research left some tantalising 
µZKDW LIV"¶ /LJJHWW 	 0\HUV GHYHORSHG D QHZ FLJDUHWWH LQ WKH 10V 
by adding the rare metallic element palladium into the tobacco. Skin 
painting experiments on mice suggested that the new brand, set to 
be called Epic, led to 95-100 per cent fewer tumours than ordinary 
cigarettes. Ultimately, internal pressure from the rest of the industry 
(which had not yet publicly accepted that smoking caused cancer) 
as well as external pressure from the tobacco control movement 
led to the company withholding it from the market. Epic was held 
back by the same factors that would hinder every attempt to reduce 
the harms of cigarette smoking in the twentieth century: advertising 
bans which prevented companies from informing the public about 
SXWDWLYH KHDOWK EHQH¿WV RSSRVLWLRQ IURP DQWLVPRNLQJ FDPSDLJQHUV 
who feared that safer products would deter smokers from quitting, 
and the industry’s own reluctance to implicate conventional cigarette 
as unsafe for fear of accepting liability. As one Liggett and Myers’ 
executive later said, Epic ‘would have been attacked from all sides 
- the government, health authorities, antismoking groups, and 
especially our competitors.’ (Kluger: 461)
Until circa 1980, many of the attempts to modify cigarettes were 
collaborative efforts between industry and government agencies. 
The US National Cancer Institute set up the Tobacco Working 
Group in 1968 and spent $6 million a year in the search for a safer 
cigarette (Fairchild and Colgrove, 2004). In Britain, the government 
IRUPHG WKH ,QGHSHQGHQW 6FLHQWL¿F &RPPLWWHH RQ 6PRNLQJ DQG 
Health in 1973 to oversee efforts to reconstitute cigarettes in a less 
damaging form. 
One promising avenue was reducing tar yields. Cigarettes typically 
have ten times as much tar as they do nicotine (eg. 10mg tar and 
1PJ QLFRWLQH DQG VLQFH WKH UDWLR LV ¿[HG WKHUH LV D OLPLW WR KRZ IDU 
tar yields can be reduced without making cigarettes unsatisfying, 
but epidemiological evidence had shown that smokers of high tar 
cigarettes were at greater risk than smokers of low tar cigarettes. 
In the USA, Dr Gio Gori led an industry-government collaboration 
to reduce tar yields to the point at which cigarettes would pose what 
he called a ‘tolerable risk’ (Kluger, 1996: 448-449). Assuming a 
linear relationship between tar yields and disease, Gori made some 
rather simplistic calculations and concluded that ‘it is reasonable to 
expect that the current epidemic proportions of smoking-related 
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diseases could be reduced to minimal levels in slightly over a 
decade’ if smokers shifted en masse to very low tar (‘ultra-light’) 
cigarettes (Gori, 1976).
The most concerted British initiative was the development of ‘tobacco 
substitutes’ in the 1970s. The idea was to replace some of the 
tobacco in cigarettes with less toxic cellulose. Like the industry, the 
JRYHUQPHQW KDG D ¿QDQFLDO PRWLYH IRU GHYHORSLQJ D OHVV KD]DUGRXV 
cigarette on British shores. A successful product, if exported, ‘had 
the potential of saving foreign currency and ... improving the balance 
of payments’ (Berridge, 2007: 143). The industry invested tens of 
millions of pounds in tobacco substitutes and the new products 
ZHUH FOHDUHG IRU VDOH LQ $SULO 1 DIWHU WKH ,QGHSHQGHQW 6FLHQWL¿F 
Committee on Smoking and Health concluded that ‘there is no 
doubt that they are a contribution to safety.’ (Van Rossum, 1978: 
3) Three months later, on a date picked by the government, eleven 
new cigarette brands containing up to 50 per cent tobacco substitutes 
were put on the market. It was a commercial disaster. A year after 
the launch of the new brands, their combined sales made up less 
than one per cent of the market. The most successful of them, 
Peer ZDV ¿QDOO\ WDNHQ RII WKH VKHOYHV LQ 1
 
Smokers were given little reason to switch to the new brands. 
Advertising restrictions forbid any claim that one cigarette was less 
hazardous than another and the government decided to levy the 
VDPH UDWH RI WD[ RQ ERWK WUDGLWLRQDO DQG PRGL¿HG ULVN SURGXFWV 7KH 
LQGXVWU\ KDG H[SHFWHG µVRPH IRUP RI TXDOL¿HG SXEOLF VXSSRUW¶ IURP 
the government for the new cigarettes but instead found itself on 
WKH HQG RI D µFDPSDLJQ RI YLOL¿FDWLRQ¶ 9DQ 5RVVXP  $FWLRQ RQ 
Smoking and Health and the Health Education Council opposed 
the ‘safer smoking’ initiative, with the latter declaring that shifting 
IURP WUDGLWLRQDO WR PRGL¿HG FLJDUHWWHV ZDV DNLQ WR MXPSLQJ RXW RI 
WKH WKLUW\VL[WK UDWKHU WKDQ WKH WKLUW\QLQWK ÀRRU RI D EXLOGLQJ 5RODQG 
Moyle, the Minister for Health, told the public that ‘cigarettes with 
or without substitutes can be debilitating and ultimately lethal’ and 
UHDI¿UPHG KLV FRPPLWPHQW WR µWKH XOWLPDWH REMHFWLYH RI D VPRNH
free society’’ (ibid.: 4). 
These sudden denunciations stood in contrast to more encouraging 
noises from the Ministry of Health and the Royal College of 
Physicians a few years earlier but, by 1977, attitudes were beginning 
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to harden and total abstinence was increasingly seen as the only 
option in tobacco control. As Berridge notes of the tobacco substitutes 
GHEDFOH µSURGXFW PRGL¿FDWLRQ DQG ³VDIHU´ VPRNLQJ KDG IDOOHQ IRXO 
of a major shift in health policy.’ (Berridge, 2007: 155)  
Gio Gori’s work on low-yield cigarettes fell victim to the same 
attitudinal sea-change in the USA, although the ambitious scientist’s 
hubris also played its part. In 1978, Gori published an article in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association in which he asserted 
that cigarettes were virtually harmless below a certain tar level and 
went on to name existing brands which could be smoked in large 
quantities ‘without exceeding tolerable levels’ (Gori and Lynch, 
1978). Sales of the supposedly least hazardous brand soared by 
50 per cent after the paper was published and Gori’s naïve 
assumptions drew a hail of criticism from health authorities who 
feared that Americans were being given carte blanche to carry on 
smoking (Kluger, 452). The government’s interest in developing 
safer smoking alternatives subsided thereafter.
Nicotine delivery devices
By the end of the decade, the tobacco industry’s hopes of modifying 
conventional cigarettes had turned from ‘a gallant acceptance of 
the challenge to a cynical acceptance of an inevitably harmful 
product’ (Glantz, 1996: 169). Subsequent efforts at harm reduction 
focused on non-combustible tobacco products and alternative 
nicotine delivery devices. The American tobacco giant R.J. Reynolds 
spent hundreds of millions of dollars on its near-smokeless Premier 
brand and launched it in a few US states in 1988, but smokers were 
indifferent. Based on the principle of ‘heat, not burn’ Premier was 
almost certainly less hazardous to health, but it had so little in 
common with conventional cigarettes that it required its own 
instruction manual and those who tried it in the test-cities of St Louis 
and Phoenix found it unsatisfying, perplexing and smelly. It was 
swiftly abandoned. 
Philip Morris made similar efforts with brands called Next and Accord, 
DQG 5- 5H\QROGV UHODXQFKHG D KHDYLO\ PRGL¿HG YHUVLRQ RI Premier 
in 1996 under the name Eclipse. Eclipse was closer to a conventional 
cigarette but released much less ‘secondhand’ smoke and delivered 
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fewer potentially harmful chemicals to the user (R.J. Reynolds, 
2000). Even ardent opponents of the tobacco industry, such as 
Senator Henry Waxman, accepted that Eclipse was ‘safer, relatively 
VSHDNLQJ¶ )DLU¿HOG 00 EXW DOO WKH PDMRU 86 KHDOWK RUJDQLVDWLRQV 
- bar the Institute of Medicine - rejected it without trial and the 
American Cancer Society fought for it to be taken off the market, 
claiming that it ‘may be more lethal than other low-tar cigarettes’ 
and pointed to the tobacco industry’s ‘long history of deception.’ 
(American Cancer Society, 2000) The product is still available in 
the USA, albeit with a very niche customer base.
Pharmaceutical nicotine
By the end of the millennium, despite billions of dollars spent on 
research and hundreds of patents acquired, a saleable reduced 
harm cigarette still eluded the tobacco industry. Manufacturing a 
known carcinogen continued to be a more viable business proposition 
than producing and marketing a less hazardous tobacco product. 
The only safer nicotine products that had gained the support of 
public health campaigners were pharmaceutical products such as 
patches and gums. Licensed as smoking-cessation aids, ‘nicotine 
replacement therapy’ (NRT) has a relatively modest success rate 
when it comes to helping smokers quit. It is widely accepted that 
its use increases the chances of successful quitting by 50 to 70 
per cent (Stead, 2008: 2), but the number of successful quitters 
UHPDLQV ORZ $V QRWHG LQ WKH GH¿QLWLYH &RFKUDQH UHYLHZ DW OHDVW 
95 per cent of unaided attempts to stop smoking end in failure, so 
even those who use the most effective forms of NRT have less 
than a ten per cent chance of being a nonsmoker after six months 
(ibid: 13). 
6RPH UHFHQW VWXGLHV KDYH TXHVWLRQHG WKH HI¿FDF\ RI 157 LQ EULQJLQJ 
about longterm abstinence. A study in Tobacco Control found that 
relapse rates were no different for people taking NRT than for those 
who quit ‘cold turkey’ (Alpert et al., 2012) and a study in Archives 
of Internal Medicine found no difference in successful quit attempts 
between NRT users and controls (Carpenter et al., 2011). Although 
VRPH VPRNHUV ¿QG 157 KHOSIXO LWV ZLGHVSUHDG XVH RYHU WKUHH 
decades has not had a dramatic effect on the smoking rate. A recent 
study in the Annual Review of Public Health found no correlation 
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between NRT use and smoking cessation rates at the national level 
and concluded: ‘To date, there is no evidence that such policies [ie. 
recommending that ‘pharmaceutical aids be used in all quit attempts’] 
lead to an increase in successful cessation in the population... That 
successful smoking cessation has not increased ... despite the 
increased efforts focused on it suggests that there is an urgent need 
to revisit current tobacco control policy.’ (Pierce et al., 2012)
19
The new wave of smoking 
alternatives
Two products dominate the tobacco harm reduction debate in the 
WZHQW\¿UVW FHQWXU\ 1HLWKHU RI WKHP ZHUH GHYHORSHG E\ µ%LJ 7REDFFR¶ 
if that term refers to multi-national cigarette companies, and both 
RI WKHP HQWHUHG WKH ¿HOG RI KDUP UHGXFWLRQ RXW RI WKH EOXH 7KH\ 
are electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) and Swedish-style oral 
tobacco (snus). 
E-cigarettes
Writing in 2001, the public health doctor John Britton suggested 
that it was ‘necessary to develop nicotine delivery products that 
can provide the nicotine that the addict wants, and with the speed 
of delivery achieved by the cigarette, but without the harmful products 
of tobacco combustion.’ (Britton et al., 2001: 15) Unbeknownst to 
him, the Beijing pharmacist Hon Lik had invented just such a product 
a year earlier. The electronic cigarette (e-cigarette) uses a battery 
and atomiser to vaporize a liquid combination of nicotine, water 
and propylene glycol which is absorbed into the bloodstream via 
the lungs. Much of its potential as a harm reduction product stems 
from the way it closely mimics the smoking experience, including 
the ‘throat hit’ and the rapid nicotine absorption. The vapour itself 
is almost entirely odourless and contains no burnt matter, no tar, 
and no carbon monoxide.
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The e-cigarette is the kind of product the tobacco industry 
contemplated for many decades but never brought to market. British 
American Tobacco (BAT) experimented with non-tobacco nicotine 
delivery devices as early as 1960 when it embarked on ‘Project 
Ariel’, an effort to create a cigarette without tobacco, based on the 
then-radical hypothesis that people smoked for the nicotine only. 
Despite numerous prototypes and several patents, all BAT’s efforts 
were stillborn, including a non-combustible device called Favor 
which was found to be ‘extremely irritating’ on the throat and was 
never brought to market (Proctor, 2003: 90). In the late 1990s, BAT 
formed BAT Cigatronics Ltd. to develop a ‘non-combustible completely 
³VPRNHIUHH´ HOHFWURQLF FLJDUHWWH VKDSHG DQG VL]HG GHYLFH GHVLJQHG 
to create and control nicotine vapour for delivery, via the lungs’ (BAT, 
1998: 3). A prototype for a disposable device containing the nicotine 
equivalent of a packet of cigarettes was developed but, again, the 
product was never launched.
Today, the e-cigarette market is growing rapidly. There are more 
than 650,000 e-cigarette users in the UK, according to Action on 
Smoking and Health (ASH, 2013). The UK’s Electronic Cigarette 
Consumer Association estimates that there will be a million owners 
by the end of 2013, up from just a thousand in 2007 (ECCA, n.d.). 
The Electronic Cigarette Industry Trade Association estimates that 
the e-cigarette market is growing at the extraordinary rate of thirty 
per cent per month (Matrix Insight, 2012: 49).
Since e-cigarettes are a relatively new product, much of the evidence 
RI WKHLU HI¿FDF\ DV D VXEVWLWXWH IRU VPRNLQJ UHPDLQV DQHFGRWDO EXW 
early empirical evidence is encouraging. A 2011 clinical trial found 
that e-cigarette use led to sustained smoking abstinence for 22.5 
per cent of smokers who were not motivated to quit, and there was 
a large reduction in cigarette consumption for a further 32.5 per 
cent (Polosa et al., 2011). As for their safety, a study in the Journal 
of Public Health Policy reported that e-cigarettes are ‘comparable 
in toxicity to conventional nicotine replacement products’ with trace 
OHYHOV RI WREDFFRVSHFL¿F QLWURVDPLQHV GHWHFWHG DW 0000 SHU 
cent of the level found in conventional cigarettes (Cahn and Siegel, 
2010: 18). ‘Thus far,’ write Cahn and Siegel, ‘none of the more than 
10,000 chemicals present in tobacco smoke, including over 40 
known carcinogens, has been shown to be present in the cartridges 
or vapour of electronic cigarettes in anything greater than trace 
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quantities.’ (ibid: 26) A 2013 study in Tobacco Control found that 
‘levels of toxicants [in e-cigarettes] were 9-450 times lower than in 
cigarette smoke’ (Goniewicz et al., 2013). The National Institute 
IRU +HDOWK DQG &OLQLFDO ([FHOOHQFH QRWHV WKDW WKHUH DUH µQR ¿UP 
cases of harm that are directly attributable to e-cigarette use.’ (NICE, 
2012: 64)
Swedish snus
6QXV UK\PHV ZLWK µMXLFH¶ LV ¿QHO\ FXW PRLVW WREDFFR LQ D WHDEDJ
like pouch which is placed under the top lip thereby allowing the 
nicotine to absorb through the gum. It has been used in Sweden 
for more than two hundred years but fell out of favour during the 
cigarette age of the mid-twentieth century. In the 1970s, snus was 
associated with old men and appeared to be moribund as a 
consumer product, but growing acceptance of the dangers of 
cigarette smoking led to a dramatic revival in its fortunes. The 
unprompted mass switchover of the last four decades has had a 
dramatic impact on rates of smoking and smoking-related disease. 
In 1976, Sweden’s male smoking rate was an unexceptional 40 
per cent. Thereafter, snus consumption more than doubled and, 
by the end of the century, Sweden’s smoking rate was the lowest 
in Europe. In 2000, a third of male ex-smokers had used snus as 
a cessation aid and Sweden was almost unique in having a smoking 
rate that was higher for women than for men (snus has traditionally 
been used mainly by men). 
Today, only 13 per cent of Swedish men and 15 per cent of Swedish 
women are daily smokers (Haagensen, 2012: 57), much lower than 
the EU average of 29 per cent and 18 per cent for men and women 
respectively (OECD, 2012).2 Unsurprisingly, Sweden has the lowest 
rate of tobacco-related mortality - including lung cancer mortality 
- in Europe, despite consuming the same quantity of tobacco (by 
weight) as other countries (Rodu and Cole, 2004). 
2   $OWHUQDWLYH VPRNLQJ SUHYDOHQFH ¿JXUHV LVVXHG E\ (XUREDURPHWHU DUH VLPLODU ZLWK DQ 
EU average of 28 per cent 
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Empirical evidence from Sweden and Norway strongly suggests 
that switching to snus is an effective cessation technique for a 
VLJQL¿FDQW QXPEHU RI VPRNHUV *LOOMDP DQG *DODQWL 00 $ VWXG\ 
of Norwegians found that 48 per cent of smokers who used snus 
to quit remained abstinent, compared to only 26 per cent of those 
who used NRT (Scheffels et al., 2012). A small but growing evidence 
base from countries which have no tradition of using snus also 
shows that it is an acceptable substitute for many smokers (Joksiü 
et al., 2011).
At one time, snus was assumed to increase the risk of oral cancer, 
but the weight of epidemiological evidence shows no such association 
(Rosenquist et al. 2005). More recently, it has been claimed that 
snus increases the risk of pancreatic cancer and heart attacks, but 
rigorous epidemiological research has again failed to support this 
(Bertuccio et al., 2011; Hansson, 2012). Sweden has a relatively 
low incidence of both oral and pancreatic cancer by European 
standards and, in 2001, the EU took the unprecedented step of 
removing the cancer warning from a tobacco product when it changed 
its regulations for Swedish snus products (European Commission, 
1999: 43-51).
Snus is little known outside Scandinavia and there is widespread 
LJQRUDQFH DERXW LWV ORZ ULVN SUR¿OH ,WV SRWHQWLDO DV DQ DOWHUQDWLYH WR 
smoking, though clearly demonstrated in Sweden, is constrained 
by a lack of consumer knowledge. A study in the US found that 51 
per cent of ‘highly educated professionals’ believe that the health 
risks of snus use and cigarette smoking are similar (Peiper et al., 
2010). Even in Norway, where snus consumption is common, only 
 SHU FHQW RI VPRNHUV EHOLHYH WKDW VQXV KDV D µIDU ORZHU¶ ULVN SUR¿OH 
than cigarettes, while 40 per cent believe the risks from snus use 
are ‘equal or higher’ (Lund, 2012). Perceptions amongst health 
professionals are also mixed. Only 36 per cent of Norwegian general 
practitioners believe that snus is ‘much less harmful’ than cigarettes, 
while 15 per cent believe it to be as harmful or more harmful (Lund 
and Scheffels, 2012). 
There is, however, a more profound hindrance to tobacco harm 
reduction than mere ignorance. The legal status of e-cigarettes and 
snus in many jurisdictions is the very opposite of what might be 
H[SHFWHG IURP D FDOP DVVHVVPHQW RI WKHLU ULVN SUR¿OHV 0DQ\ 
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countries have outright prohibitions on snus, e-cigarettes and/or 
nicotine-containing liquid. The sale of oral tobacco, including snus, 
has been prohibited in the EU since 1992 on the basis that the 
Common Market needed to be harmonised after Ireland and the 
UK banned the sale of Skoal Bandits, an American brand of snus, 
LQ WKH 10V 7KH SXEOLF KHDOWK MXVWL¿FDWLRQ IRU WKH (8ZLGH EDQ 
was the presumed association between snus and oral cancer. 
Sweden negotiated an exemption from the ban when it joined the 
EU in 1995. This exemption undermined the EU’s ostensible 
commitment to market harmonisation, and the EU’s subsequent 
acknowledgement that snus is not carcinogenic undermines the 
SXEOLF KHDOWK MXVWL¿FDWLRQ IRU WKH EDQ ,Q OLJKW RI WKH µ6ZHGLVK 
experience’ of widespread snus consumption, low smoking rates 
and low rates of cancer, the EU ban appears arbitrary and counter-
productive. In spite of this, public health groups are pressing the 
government of Norway, the only non-EU country in Scandinavia, 
to ban snus by 2017.
Likewise, there are de facto or de jure prohibitions on e-cigarettes 
in several countries, including Greece, Singapore, Israel, Lithuania, 
Brazil, Norway and Panama. Nicotine-containing liquid is banned 
in Canada and Australia on grounds of safety. In Denmark, 
e-cigarettes are classed as medicinal products and have not yet 
been authorised for sale. In New Zealand, e-cigarettes can only 
be sold in pharmacies as medicinal devices. Anyone found in 
possession of an e-cigarette in Hong Kong can be given a two year 
prison sentence. Meanwhile, cigarettes are widely available in 
almost every country in the world and are by far the most commonly 
used - and most lethal - nicotine product.
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Harm reduction and its 
opponents
7KH DUJXPHQWV IRU DQG DJDLQVW KDUP UHGXFWLRQ LQ WKH ¿HOG RI QLFRWLQH 
DUH PXFK WKH VDPH DV WKRVH LQ WKH ¿HOG RI LOOHJDO GUXJV ZKHUH 
governments have increasingly adopted needle exchanges, 
methadone programmes and safe consumption rooms to reduce 
GUXJUHODWHG PRUWDOLW\ ,Q WKH ¿HOG RI GUXJV KDUP UHGXFWLRQ LV ZLGHO\ 
considered to be a healthier and more humane approach than rigid 
prohibition. The biggest difference between harm reduction for 
narcotics and harm reduction for nicotine is that many more people 
die each year as a result of smoking than die as a result of drug 
use, albeit usually at an older age. 
The other key difference is that narcotics are illegal whereas 
cigarettes are not. Accusations of institutional hypocrisy made 
against governments which facilitate the consumption of illicit drugs 
carry less weight in the case of tobacco harm reduction since 
cigarette smoking is legal. Advocates of e-cigarettes and snus cannot 
be accused of condoning smoking since both products are alternatives 
to smoking and the former does not even contain tobacco. At worst, 
they can be accused of condoning nicotine use, but nicotine does 
not cause disease and, as a drug, it is much closer to caffeine than 
to opiates. Tobacco harm reduction therefore forces campaigners 
WR DVN WKHPVHOYHV LI LW GLVHDVH WKH\ DUH ¿JKWLQJ RU LI DGGLFWLYH 
SOHDVXUHV DQG FRUSRUDWH SUR¿WV DUH D JUHDWHU FRQFHUQ
The economist Thomas Sowell divides people into those who have 
the ‘tragic vision’ and those who have the ‘vision of the anointed’ 
(Sowell, 1995). The latter believe that the problems of mankind are 
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created by institutions and that, through legislation, solutions can 
be found - in this instance, total worldwide abstinence. The former 
VHH PDQNLQG DV LQKHUHQWO\ ÀDZHG DQG EHOLHYH WKDW WKHUH DUH UDUHO\ 
‘solutions’, only trade-offs. There are those who believe that 
legislation, denormalisation and NRT can reduce the prevalence 
of tobacco use to less than 0.5 percent of the population within 
twenty years (Thomson, 2012: 294). Others look at the failure of 
similar efforts to suppress alcohol and drugs in the past and view 
the neo-prohibitionist approach as utopian, unrealistic and ultimately 
damaging to health. 
Back of the envelope calculations of how many premature deaths 
could be prevented by a shift to alternative nicotine products are 
easy to produce. ‘If all the smokers in Britain stopped smoking 
cigarettes and started smoking e-cigarettes,’ writes John Britton of 
the Royal College of Physicians’ Tobacco Advisory Group, ‘we 
would save 5 million deaths in people who are alive today. It’s a 
massive potential public health prize.’ (BBC, 2013) This assumes 
that every smoker will be happy to shift to the electronic devices, 
DQ XQUHDOLVWLF VFHQDULR EXW VLJQL¿FDQW KHDOWK JDLQV FDQ EH SUHGLFWHG 
whatever the level of uptake.
In a private letter written in 1984 when harm reduction was out of 
fashion and total abstinence was the order of the day, the renowned 
epidemiologist Richard Peto pondered the question of ‘how many 
cancer deaths would be likely to be caused each year if one-third 
of the British population become habitual tobacco suckers.’ (Peto, 
1984) This was a reference to snus, which was becoming the 
subject of controversy in Britain as a result of the Skoal Bandits 
furore. Peto acknowledged that the health risks associated with 
snus, if any, were unknown and would take many years to identify. 
He cautioned that ‘no matter what epidemiological studies you 
mount, you probably won’t get even a preliminary answer this 
century, so as a practical basis for action I suggest you assume 
that the adoption of Skoal Bandit-like products by a quarter or a 
half of the British population will cause about 1000 cancer deaths 
a year. In contrast, tobacco smoking currently causes about 100,000 
British deaths a year!’ (emphasis in the original). Peto based his 
prediction of a thousand cancer deaths on the assumption that 
snus had a similar risk SUR¿OH to the kind of loose oral snuff used 
earlier in the century in the USA. It took many years before the 
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epidemiological evidence showed no association between Swedish 
snus and mouth cancer. He was, however, correct in his basic 
assumptions which he outlined as follows:
‘   The risks are not zero 
     The risks can probably be reduced by immediately  
commissionable laboratory research;
   The risks are much, much less than those of cigarette use.’  
(Peto, 1984)
Writing about Skoal Bandits in the Lancet the following year, the 
addiction specialist Michael Russell came to a similar conclusion:
‘ Our results suggest that this new product could help people  
trying to give up smoking. It might be cheaper than nicotine  
chewing gum and would not require a prescription. If all smokers  
in Britain switched to sachets about 50,000 premature deaths  
per year might eventually be saved at an annual cost of less than  
1,000 deaths from mouth cancer.’ (Russell et al., 1985: 1370)
Speaking to Virginia Berridge in 1995, Russell recalled that such 
messages fell on stony ground in the 1980s. ‘I gave a talk ¿IWHHQ 
years ago at a respectable conference in Edinburgh - if you could 
get people to switch to snuff you could prevent lung cancer and 
bronchitis - all for a small risk. People don’t like it if you raise these 
issues.’ Such arguments ‘carried little weight with a public health 
lobby which still regarded safer smoking (in whatever form) as a 
discredited strategy and abstention as the only aim,’ writes Berridge 
(2007: 271). ‘The VFLHQWL¿F message might have been right, but it 
was coming from the wrong messengers at the wrong time.’3
In the USA, the oral pathologist Brad Rodu was roundly condemned 
by anti-smoking campaigners when he published his book For 
Smokers Only: How Smokeless Tobacco Can Save Your Life (1995). 
 3   In 1984, the British Medical Association began to abandon its ‘fusty’ image as an 
old-fashioned trade union for doctors and became more politically active. Harm reduc-
WLRQ KDG QR SODFH LQ LWV QHZO\ PLOLWDQW DJHQGD DQG LWV ¿UVW PDMRU FDPSDLJQ ZDV GLUHFWHG 
against Skoal Bandits (Berridge, 2007: 233).
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Like Peto, he based his calculations on the risk SUR¿OHV of the most 
carcinogenic smokeless products but nevertheless concluded that 
‘if all 46 million smokers used smokeless tobacco instead, the 
United States would see, at worst, 6,000 deaths from smoking-
related cancers, heart problems, and lung disease.’ (Rodu, 1995: 
131) Despite the book’s title clearly indicating that Rodu was not 
condoning the use of smokeless tobacco by nonsmokers, he was 
accused of being ‘irresponsible’ and ‘naïve’ by public health activists 
who have ostracised him in the years since (Sullum: 78-80). 
Arguments against safer products
Opposition to harm reduction is by no means universal in public 
health circles. A number of organisations, including the American 
Association of Public Health Physicians, Action on Smoking and 
Health, the American Council on Science and Health and the Royal 
College of Physicians have recommended that snus be re-legalised 
and e-cigarettes be encouraged. For others, however, stated 
concerns include the possibility that alternative nicotine products 
act as a ‘gateway’ to cigarette smoking, that some people will use 
less harmful products as well as cigarettes, and that snus and 
e-cigarettes allow smokers to ‘get around’ smoking bans.
Taking the objectives of modern public health at face value, one 
can consider the following theoretical process by which a less 
harmful product could negatively affect population health. It is 
possible that individuals who would not have taken up smoking 
because they think it is too dangerous might take up the less harmful 
product. If Product A is half as hazardous as Product B and the 
entire market shifts from B to A, then net harm will fall by half. If, 
however, Product A attracts so many new customers that the entire 
market doubles, the net effect would be zero. And if the market 
increases threefold, net harm would increase by 50 per cent. 
How likely is it that a shift to safer nicotine products will increase 
net harm? Further research will quantify exactly how much safer 
e-cigarettes and snus are in comparison to conventional cigarettes, 
but there is little doubt that they are at least 90 per cent less 
hazardous and are probably in the region of 98-99.9 per cent less 
hazardous (Rodu, 2011; Cahn and Siegel, 2011). If so, the risk 
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posed by these products is of a similar order to that of eating red 
meat, drinking alcohol in moderation, driving a car, sun-bathing or 
any of the other run-of-the-mill lifestyle choice. 
Approximately twenty per cent of the UK population currently use 
nicotine, of whom the vast majority smoke cigarettes. The nicotine 
market cannot, therefore, increase by more than ¿YHIROG (100 per 
cent). If snus and e-cigarettes are 95 per cent less hazardous than 
cigarettes (a very conservative estimate), then there would have 
to be a more than twentyfold increase in the size of the nicotine 
market for net harm to rise above the current level. This is a 
mathematical impossibility.
Alternatively, it is possible that individuals might take up the less 
harmful nicotine product and then move on to cigarettes - the 
‘gateway’ effect. There is, however, very little evidence that reduced 
harm products appeal to nonsmokers in the ¿UVW place. In the case 
of e-cigarettes, ASH (2012) notes that ‘there is little evidence of use 
by those who have never smoked.’ Based on survey data, ASH 
found that ‘regular use of e-cigarettes is extremely rare’ amongst 
children. Only one per cent of 16-18 year olds - and zero per cent 
of 11-15 year olds - use an e-cigarette more than once a week and 
this tiny minority is made up of smokers and ex-smokers. ASH found 
no regular users of e-cigarettes amongst non-smoking teenagers:
‘Among young people who have never smoked 1% have  
³tried e- cigarettes once or twice´ 0% report continued  
e-cigarette use and 0% expect to try an e-cigarette soon... 
Frequent (more than weekly) use of e-cigarettes was  
FRQ¿QHG almost entirely to ex-smokers and daily smokers.’
Far from acting as a gateway to smoking, all the evidence indicates 
that e-cigarettes are a gateway from smoking. Switching from vaping 
to smoking would require a conscious decision to take up a habit 
that is ten times more expensive and one hundred times worse for 
your health. The prohibition or over-regulation of these devices will 
close off a hypothetical gateway from e-cigarettes to tobacco, but it 
will also close off a very real gateway for people who want to go from 
tobacco to e-cigarettes, and that is the path most travelled. 
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Some have complained that e-cigarettes ‘normalise’ smoking. ‘We 
are especially concerned that e-cigarettes might reinforce the 
smoking habit as they are designed to closely mimic smoking 
actions’, says the British Medical Association (2013). For this reason, 
the BMA has called for the smoking ban to be expanded to include 
e-cigarettes despite it being almost inconceivable that ‘passive 
vaping’ could pose any risk to bystanders. On the campus of the 
University of California, San Francisco, it is against the rules to 
carry, let alone use, an e-cigarette, even outdoors.  
For all the talk of ‘denormalising’ tobacco use, smoking prevalence 
in most countries exceeds twenty per cent of the adult population. 
Smoking may not be universal, but it can hardly be described as 
abnormal or unusual. In 2010, cigarettes and rolling tobacco made 
up 94.9 per cent of the EU’s nicotine market. E-cigarettes and NRT 
held just 0.4 per cent each while smokeless tobacco held 0.6 per 
cent (Matrix Insight, 2012: 20). Whilst there is evidence that the 
‘denormalisation’ approach can lead to lower smoking rates 
(Hammond et al., 2006), it remains doubtful whether e-cigarettes 
‘normalise’ smoking in any meaningful way. As a device that has 
spread rapidly by word-of-mouth in recent years, it would be more 
accurate to say that e-cigarettes normalise harm reduction and 
smoking cessation. Moreover, there are social costs incurred by the 
denormalisation/stigmatisation approach which can be avoided by 
the more liberal harm reduction approach (Bayer and Stuber, 2006). 
Once bitten, twice shy?
A further objection sometimes raised is that harm reduction has 
been tried before and failed. Low tar cigarettes and ¿OWHU tips are 
now widely portrayed as tobacco industry ruses to trick consumers 
and delay tougher regulation. This ‘once bitten, twice shy’ argument 
requires some rewriting of history. Lowering tar yields and 
investigating the ‘safer cigarette’ had the support of many public 
health scientists, including some of those who ¿UVW LGHQWL¿HG the 
link between cigarette smoking and disease, as well as successive 
Surgeon Generals and several Ministers for Health. The Federal 
Trade Commission recommended that tar yields be printed on 
cigarette packs in 1969 (Sullum: 69) and many governments RI¿FLDOO\ 
advised smokers to switch to low tar brands in the 1980s and 1990s. 
30
Moreover, the harm reduction efforts were not complete failures. 
There is ample evidence that the XQ¿OWHUHG high-tar cigarettes of 
the 1950s posed more of a health hazard than the ¿OWHUHG low-tar 
cigarettes of later decades (Hammond et al., 1976; Tang et al., 
1995; Blizzard and Dwyer, 2001; Harris et al., 2004). The European 
Union has progressively lowered the maximum permissible levels 
of tar and nicotine in cigarettes, presumably because it believes 
lower yields to be less dangerous. Although the ‘safer smoking’ 
initiative of the twentieth century was a more collaborative effort 
between the tobacco industry and government than is often 
recognised, the industry was guilty of keeping its misgivings about 
‘light’ cigarettes to itself and it clearly failed to produce a ‘tolerable 
risk’ cigarette. None of this has any bearing on the safety or HI¿FDF\ 
of snus and e-cigarettes, however. ‘Once bitten, twice shy’ is 
fallacious reasoning. 
Arguments made against tobacco harm reduction on health grounds 
are not compelling. Opposition to e-cigarettes and snus can only 
be properly understood in the context of the public health lobby’s 
longstanding goals of eradicating recreational nicotine use and 
destroying the tobacco industry. An underlying objection of anti-
smoking campaigners to these products is that cigarette companies 
could survive and thrive by selling them. Several tobacco ¿UPV have 
started selling snus and Lorillard became the ¿UVW tobacco company 
to acquire an e-cigarette ¿UP in April 2012. British American Tobacco 
has created a startup company called Nicoventures to create 
products for ‘smokers who may not want to quit smoking but who 
want a safer alternative to cigarettes’ while Philip Morris has patented 
a nicotine aerosol product (Matrix Insight, 2012: 52) Many anti-
smoking veterans would ¿QG it intolerable if ‘Big Tobacco’ became 
a player in harm reduction since they have long since cast the 
industry as a consummate enemy with whom they are engaged in 
a war of annihilation. 
Meanwhile the pharmaceutical industry has an incentive to lobby 
against non-medicinal nicotine products and national governments 
have a ¿QDQFLDO incentive to perpetuate the smoking of highly-taxed 
cigarettes. The novelist Lionel Shriver, who kicked her smoking 
habit thanks to e-cigarettes, blames opposition to the devices on 
‘kneejerk cultural prejudice, puritanical vindictiveness, corporate 
collusion, and the unconscionable greed of tax authorities that won’t 
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be able to heap the same punitive, FRQ¿VFDWRU\, opportunistic duties 
on a product that doesn’t hurt anyone.’ (Shriver, 2013)
Resistance to e-cigarettes - which contain no tobacco and are, for 
the most part, not made by ‘Big Tobacco’ - is consistent with the 
puritanism and prejudice Shriver alludes to. Moral indignation 
towards pleasure-giving ‘vices’ may well be a motivation for some 
of those working in the tobacco control industry. Bell and Keane 
(2012) note that objections to e-cigarettes have a moral dimension 
and that ‘it is not clear that further research into e-cigarettes will 
substantially alter current opinion. This is because their dangers 
stem not merely from the constituents of the products themselves, 
but the ideological challenge they pose to the binary categorisation 
of nicotine into not only remedial and harmful forms, but morally 
³good´ and ³bad´ ones.’ 
As smokeless products, e-cigarettes and snus do not violate the 
anti-smoking lobby’s vision of a ‘smoke-free society’ - indeed, they 
are likely to bring it closer to fruition - but recreational nicotine use 
of this sort remains morally suspect to some of its members and 
was never part of the plan. The question now is whether ‘it is better 
to aim for complete exclusion or prohibition of nicotine use, or to 
accept the place of nicotine in society but to regulate to make 
nicotine products safe.’ (Britton et al., 2001: 14-15) It remains to 
be seen whether that plan is ÀH[LEOH enough to adapt to changing 
circumstances or if the abstinence-only ideology is too big a 
juggernaut to be turned around. 
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Harm reduction versus  
neo-prohibition
As previously noted, anti-smoking campaigners since the late 1970s 
have been wedded to a policy of incremental prohibition with the 
ultimate aim of an ‘endgame’ in which there is a de facto or de jure 
ban on the sale of cigarettes and/or tobacco (Proctor, 2013; Wilson 
et al., 2013). In common with earlier prohibitionist crusades, 
campaigners portray this as a battle against industry rather than 
against consumers.
The cornerstones of tobacco control orthodoxy in developed countries 
are (1) comprehensive smoking bans, (2) progressively larger 
(graphic) health warnings, (3) bans on advertising and promotion, 
(4) progressively higher tobacco taxes, and (5) distribution of 
pharmaceutical nicotine products for smoking/nicotine cessation. 
The European ‘Tobacco Control Scale’ (TCS) scorecard provides 
a check-list of anti-smoking best practice. The scorecard was devised 
in 2006 ‘to measure the implementation of tobacco control policies 
systematically at country level.’ (Joossens and Raw, 2006) Produced 
by the Association of European Cancer Leagues, it awards points 
for the following criteria:
  High tobacco prices  Extensiveness of smoking bans  Spending on public anti-smoking campaigns  Extensiveness of advertising bans  Size of health warning labels and inclusion of graphic images  Smoking cessation services, including state-funded 
pharmaceuticals
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With these policies assumed to be paramount, the UK and Ireland 
have come top of the TCS rankings in the two editions produced 
to date (2007 and 2010). Sweden came an unimpressive ninth, 
sandwiched between Belgium and Malta. 
Ireland is, in many respects, the poster boy for tobacco control. It 
was the ¿UVW European country to ban snus in the 1980s and the 
¿UVW country in the world to ban smoking in enclosed public places. 
It has the highest cigarette prices in the EU and its government 
partially funds the sale of NRT and other stop-smoking drugs. The 
UK has taken much the same path but achieves a higher ranking 
on the TCS because it introduced graphic warnings earlier and has 
a larger budget for tobacco control. 
Sweden, by contrast, has exemptions to its smoking ban, allows 
point-of-sale advertising for some tobacco products, has no graphic 
warnings, does not subsidise NRT and has VLJQL¿FDQWO\ cheaper 
cigarettes than both the UK and Ireland.4 The TCS report’s authors 
lament the fact that: ‘Surprisingly, Sweden is often NOT in support 
of strong tobacco control measures at European and international 
level.’ (Joosens and Raw, 2011) Above all, it allows the sale of snus.
One critical indicator of progress is not included in the scorecard 
- the smoking rate. Despite failing to adopt ‘strong tobacco control 
measures’, Sweden has by far the lowest smoking rate - and the 
lowest rate of lung cancer - of any EU country. Figures from the 
OECD show that Sweden had a smoking rate of 14 per cent in 
2010, less than half of the rate in Ireland (29 per cent) and a full 
four percentage points lower than the country with the second 
lowest smoking rate, Luxembourg (Luxembourg comes a miserable 
29th out of 31 in the TCS) (OECD, 2012: 59). 
4   Sweden allows closed, ventilated, designated smoking rooms. Interestingly, the Appen-
dix of the report shows that Sweden has the highest percentage of residents who are 
‘never or almost never exposed to tobacco smoke’ at work (96 per cent). Exposure to 
smoke is, however, not regarded as a criterion of success and so Sweden scores below 
Spain, which has more restrictive legislation but where only 58 per cent of residents 
report little or no exposure.
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Meanwhile, Ireland and the UK - exemplars of the orthodox tobacco 
control model - have unimpressive smoking and lung cancer rates, 
as well as being home to Western Europe’s largest black markets 
in tobacco (KPMG, 2013: 15). 
Charting the smoking rate against the Tobacco Control Scorecard 
using the most recent data (TCS, 2010 and OECD, 2012), Figure 
1 shows that there is no association between TCS scores and 
smoking prevalence (r2=0.03). Countries which ignore the neo-
prohibitionist model fare no better and no worse than those which 
follow it to the letter. This is FRQ¿UPHG by Figure 2 which charts the 
scorecard against the change in smoking prevalence in each country 
between 1990 and 2010 (OECD, 2013: 239). The data points appear 
to be scattered at random, with Ireland reducing its smoking rate 
by less than any other country (r2=0.04). Interestingly, the three 
countries that have seen the largest declines in smoking prevalence 
are all Scandinavian nations with a strong tradition of using smokeless 
tobacco.5 
 5   Norway is not in the EU and snus is therefore legal. EU law allows the sale of snus in 
Sweden only, but loose snus (ie. not contained in a pouch) is legal in Denmark. Sales 
of smokeless tobacco rose by 255 per cent in Denmark between 2000 and 2010 (from 
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Figure 1: Smoking prevalence/TCS score
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It should not be inferred from these graphs that anti-smoking policies 
have no impact on smoking rates. On the contrary, the tobacco 
control movement has succeeded in changing social norms about 
smoking and there is strong evidence that tax rises, for example, 
have reduced smoking prevalence in the past. Some policies work 
better than others, however, while some may be ineffective or even 
counterproductive. If the TCS is any guide, it appears that a relatively 
high smoking rate and a VLJQL¿FDQW problem with the illicit trade 
does not disqualify a nation from being regarded as a model of 
best practice. If policy was truly evidence-based, one might expect 
best practice to be derived from the countries with the lowest 
smoking rates. Instead, the world-beating Swedish model is ignored 
in favour of nations which have followed the neo-prohibitionist 
blueprint despite a conspicuous lack of success in reducing the 
number of smokers. 
The lack of relationship between TCS scores and smoking prevalence 
can be explained by the waning power of tax rises to deter Europeans 
from buying cigarettes and the marginal, if not counter-productive, 
impact of smoking bans, graphic warnings, display bans and nicotine 
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Figure 2: Change in smoking prevalence 1990-2010/TCS score
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The experience of Britain and Ireland in recent years supports the 
hypothesis that the neo-prohibitionist approach to tobacco control 
is producing diminishing returns at best. A report commissioned by 
three British anti-smoking groups in 2011 concluded that ‘whilst 
there has been a downward trend in smoking prevalence over 
several decades, this appears to have stagnated since 2007.’ 
(Trueman et al., 2011: 5) The authors did not dwell on the 
uncomfortable fact that this stagnation coincided with an 
unprecedented wave of neo-prohibitionist policies including a 
comprehensive smoking ban, steep tax rises, graphic warnings and 
raising the age at which tobacco could be purchased, in addition to 
gory advertising campaigns such as those showing the faces of 
smokers severed with ¿VK hooks. In the four years before the English 
smoking ban was introduced in 2007, the smoking rate dropped by 
¿YH percentage points. In the four years after, the rate dropped by 
just one percentage point.
When the tobacco control scorecard was ¿UVW devised, its creators 
noted that: ‘There is already vigorous discussion in the tobacco 
control ¿HOG of the role smokeless tobacco in Sweden (snus) has 
played in the decline in smoking prevalence.’ (Joossens and Raw, 
2006) A recent opinion piece in Tobacco Control noted that ‘a global 
natural experiment is underway where data from some nations 
which have banned or restricted access to harm-reduction products 
might be compared with those which have embraced them.’ 
(Chapman and :DNH¿HOG, 2013: i35) It is doubtful whether any 
ethics committee would approve an experiment in which one group 
is denied access to the least hazardous forms of a product but, for 
better or worse, these natural experiments are indeed underway. It 
is too early to reach ¿UP conclusions about the effect of the e-cigarette 
revolution on aggregate smoking rates, but the evidence from 
Sweden strongly suggests that the harm reduction approach has 
more to offer than the neo-prohibitionist model.
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The regulatory threat
This paper has not addressed the question of whether cigarettes 
should be legal. Most surveys ¿QG that only a minority of the public 
would support prohibition and we agree that appropriately informed 
adults should be free to smoke (Saad, 1998; BBC, 2003). Whatever 
the arguments, the fact remains that cigarettes are legal and will 
remain so for many years. It is therefore neither consistent nor 
ethical to prevent smokers from switching to much safer alternatives. 
Ongoing efforts to prohibit or medicalise e-cigarettes and snus are 
a far greater threat to public health than the products themselves. 
The EU’s revised Tobacco Products Directive, due to come into 
force in 2015-16, will introduce a de facto ban on e-cigarettes by 
limiting the nicotine content of e-cigarette liquid to a level at which 
most users would ¿QG unsatisfying. Stronger e-cigarette liquid will 
only be available as a licensed medicinal product sold with a health 
warning (European Commission, 2012: 9). If the directive becomes 
EU law, e-cigarette liquid as it is known today would be taken off 
the shelves until it can prove its safety and HI¿FDF\ as a medical 
treatment for nicotine addiction. This could take years and may not 
happen at all (no amount of subsequent evidence has been enough 
to re-legalise snus). Even if e-cigarettes secure authorisation as 
medicinal products, they would be more GLI¿FXOW to obtain than 
conventional cigarettes and would arguably have less appeal to 
smokers who do not consider themselves in need of medical 
treatment. 
The EU’s position has been supported in Britain by the Medicines 
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA, 2013). Both 
the European Commission and the MHRA support placing not only 
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e-cigarettes, but all ‘nicotine containing products’ under medical 
regulation. This category includes all existing innovations in the 
nicotine market as well as any nicotine product that is invented in 
the future. Only tobacco is excluded. This will have profound 
implications for future developments. It will leave the next generation 
of recreational nicotine products in the hands of a public health 
establishment that is instinctively drawn to precautionary bans and 
the doctrine of total abstinence.
The medicalisation of e-cigarettes has been portrayed as a way of 
putting them ‘on an equal footing’ with NRT (Erbach, 2013), but this 
ignores the pertinent fact that the pharmaceutical industry wanted 
their nicotine products to be authorised as medicines so that they 
could be marketed as drugs and sold to state-run health agencies. 
There is no other precedent for ‘nicotine delivery devices’ being 
viewed as medicines and there are no calls for the most widely sold 
‘nicotine delivery devices’ - tobacco products - to undergo medical 
authorisation. The e-cigarette industry maintains that its products 
are not medicinal drugs, but are recreational consumer products 
which can be used an alternative to smoking. There is no compelling 
reason why products containing nicotine should be medicalised 
when products containing caffeine, alcohol or sugar are not. Normal 
consumer protection laws should VXI¿FH.
Like other governments that have dealt with e-cigarettes in a heavy-
handed manner, the EU is endorsing the same neo-prohibitionist 
approach that led to the disastrous missed opportunity with Swedish 
snus. Other proposed regulations in the directive are reductio ad 
absurdum variants of orthodox tobacco control measures which, 
as the previous chapter showed, have little or no impact on smoking 
rates. These include mandating still larger graphic warnings, 
standardising the exact length and diameter of cigarettes and 
banning ‘characterising ÀDYRXULQJV’. By tying itself up with such 
trivial issues, the EU is living up to its stereotype as a bureaucratic 
machine that produces unnecessary and petty regulation. 
The most visible effect of a ban on ‘characterising ÀDYRXULQJV’ will 
be to prohibit the sale of menthol cigarettes, but it will also result in 
a de facto ban on a wide range of snus brands in Sweden (which 
are usually ÀDYRXUHG) as well as most e-cigarette ÀXLGV. Here, as 
elsewhere, the Tobacco Products Directive is stacking the deck 
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against harm reduction while introducing arbitrary regulations for 
the cigarette industry. The directive will require medical authorisation 
for most ‘nicotine-containing products’ and will require pre-
authorisation for any new tobacco product. Moreover, it will prohibit 
any labelling that might suggest that one product is less harmful 
than another. In short, it will not only kill off the two most promising 
reduced harm products, but will prevent any new innovations from 
hitting the shelves in the future. The effect will be to slice up the 
European nicotine market, dividing the spoils between cigarette 
companies and the pharmaceutical industry.
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Conclusion
Harm reduction for smokers would save many more lives than harm 
reduction for drug addicts and it would not require a penny of 
government spending. It only requires the government to step back 
and allow free market solutions to gain popularity. In practice, this 
means taxing and regulating e-cigarettes as ordinary consumer 
products to ensure basic standards of quality while allowing snus 
to be sold with appropriate and accurate labelling to inform customers 
RI LWV ULVN SUR¿OH UHODWLYH WR FLJDUHWWHV 
The neo-prohibitionist approach to public health has raised barriers 
to entry and excluded new entrants, thereby making the nicotine 
market less competitive and less innovative. Meanwhile, the cigarette 
LQGXVWU\ FRQWLQXHV WR EH KLJKO\ SUR¿WDEOH DV D KHDYLO\ UHJXODWHG 
oligopoly, as Dr Robert Branston, Deputy Director of the University’s 
Centre for Governance and Regulation, acknowledges: ‘The market 
has failed to curb cigarette manufacturers in terms of pricing power 
DQG SUR¿W DQG WREDFFR FRQWURO SROLFLHV KDYH XQLQWHQWLRQDOO\ 
exacerbated the problem.’ (Bath University, 2013) 
Consumers suffer in uncompetitive markets from higher prices and 
limited choice. Neither of these are seen as problematic by anti-
smoking campaigners who view higher cigarette prices as desirable, 
but a more serious problem arises when safer products are 
preemptively banned under the precautionary principle or cannot 
be brought to market due to advertising restrictions and heavy 
bureaucracy. As former ASH director Clive Bates puts it, ‘if you 
over-regulate a new, disruptive, low-risk alternative to the dominant 
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and deadly cigarette, you simply protect the worst products from 
competition.’ (Bates, 2013) Whether by accident or design, the 
EHQH¿FLDU\ LV WKH LQFXPEHQW LQGXVWU\ UDWKHU WKDQ WKH FRQVXPHU 
We argue that the interests of consumers are nearly always better 
advanced by the provision of accurate information and free choice 
than by prohibitions and restrictions on commercial speech. Markets 
can correct themselves more quickly than governments. Market 
failures can be corrected by free enterprise long before government 
IDLOXUHV DUH HYHQ DFNQRZOHGJHG OHW DORQH UHFWL¿HG 7UDQVIRUPLQJ D 
IUHH PDUNHW LQWR D µGDUN PDUNHW¶ FDUULHV VLJQL¿FDQW ULVNV ZKLFK DUH 
well understood by students of Prohibition and the War on Drugs. 
Restrictions on product development and marketing in the nicotine 
industry have led to information failures which have led, in turn, to 
further failures of both government and the market. Buttressed by 
political grandstanding, corporate rent-seeking, rigid ideology and 
old-fashioned puritanism, the result has been a disaster for the only 
group of people whose interests are of direct relevance: smokers. 
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